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We investigate the time-varying informativeness of credit default swap (CDS)
trading on stock returns for 302 US firms from July 2004 to August 2010.
Using the Acharya and Johnson (2007) measure, we find that CDS trading
becomes informative for an increasing number of firms as we approach the
global financial crisis (GFC). Firm numbers gradually decline post-GFC, but
remain high compared to the pre-GFC period. Furthermore, CDS trading
imposes the largest conditional price impact on firms that are recently
downgraded, regardless of rating levels. Interestingly, this holds during and
after the GFC, but not before. We offer two implications. First, despite post-
GFC outcry against the CDS market, our results suggest it exhibits enhanced
price discovery during the GFC. Second, our findings support criticism that,
in the lead-up to the GFC, rating agencies are slow in downgrading firms.
However, if downgrade decisions made during and after the GFC induce
informed trading in the CDS market, this necessarily implies that during the
midst of the GFC, rating agencies have got their act together.
“CDS in theory should mitigate risk in the financial system by allowing
investors to hedge risks. In practice, they engendered uncertainty
and fear.” — Mark Zandi, 2009 submission to U.S. House Committee
on Financial Services
Credit derivatives, in particular credit default swaps (CDS), are blamed forallowing commercial banks and insurance firms like AIG, Bear Sterns, andLehmann Brothers to take up massive positions that led to massive losses,
which triggered a credit-crunch-induced global financial crisis (GFC). At the 2009
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Institute of International Finance Meeting, George Soros, chairman of Soros Fund
Management, echoed numerous critiques to call for a ban on CDS,1 citing, “they’re
truly toxic.” Rating agencies are also blamed for assigning investment-grade ratings
to sub-prime mortgage-backed securities, and for their inertia in downgrading firms
in the lead-up to the GFC.
Despite widespread criticism from regulators and practitioners, we are not
aware of any formal study that attempts to evaluate the informativeness of CDS
trading and rating changes during the course of the GFC. A fundamental economic
role of the CDS market and rating agencies is to aggregate relevant credit-related
information and provide timely and informed prices and ratings. However, does the
price discovery role cease to function properly under extreme market conditions?
What happens to the informativeness of the CDS market as we gradually approach
and depart from the height the the GFC? Does rating level or rating change affect
the price impact of CDS spread on its reference entity’s stock return? Is the effect
symmetric for downgrades and upgrades? The motivation of our paper is to shed
some light to these questions.
Studies on information flow between bond-stock, CDS-stock and/or CDS-
bond, for example, Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002), Acharya and Johnson (2007) and
Fung et al. (2008), find that incremental information revealed by the CDS and/or
bond market occurs mainly in low-rated firms.2 Das et al. (2012) conclude that the
advent of CDS trading has a detrimental effect on the corporate bond market in
terms of reduced efficiency and no evident improvements in pricing error or liquidity.
Their finding is not surprising if the CDS market is gradually taking over credit risk
price discovery from the corporate bond market. Norden and Weber (2004) find
that CDS spreads anticipate rating downgrades by Standard and Poor’s (S&P) and
Moody’s, but reviews for downgrade impose a significant price impact on CDS
spreads. Using event-study methodology, Hull et al. (2004) find that the CDS market
anticipates both downgrades as well as reviews for downgrade, but the results are
not significant for upgrade announcements. Flannery et al. (2010) show that CDS
spreads respond to new information much quicker than credit ratings. However,
their analysis focuses only on 15 investment-grade financial institutions whose credit
ratings remain quite stable during the 2006–2009 sample period. Chava et al. (2012)
test the informativeness of rating downgrades on stock and bond returns. They find
that the price impact of downgrades on stock returns is reduced after CDS trading
on the firm’s debt commences. Furthermore, firms without CDS trading experience
larger stock and bond market reaction than a comparable sample of firms with
CDS trading.
1. A CDS is a derivative contract that is similar in nature to an insurance policy against default. It is
written on a reference entity, normally a bond that can be issued by a government, state, bank and
firm. The payoff from a CDS contract is triggered by a default event. As such, the CDS market
allows an issuer’s credit risk to be tradable at observable prices.
2. The intuition being that informed investors will set CDS or bond positions with huge expected
payoffs. Firms with weaker credit profile have a larger probability of entering into financial distress.
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To gauge the informativeness of CDS trading on stock returns, we utilize the
Acharya and Johnson (2007) measure on a sample of 302 US firms from July 2004
to August 2010. In the lead-up to and during the GFC, when financial markets were
gripped by a systemic credit crunch, we naturally expect to observe higher and
more volatile CDS spreads. A time-series plot of the cross-sectional average CDS
spread for our firm sample in Figure 1 (panel A) confirms that this is indeed the
case. Accordingly, one would naturally expect the informativeness of CDS trading
on stock returns to be similarly impaired during the GFC.
Our main results reveal a starkly dissimilar picture on the informativeness of
CDS trading during the GFC. We find that, with the onset of the crisis, CDS trading
significantly affects stock returns for an increasing number of firms. As we move
away from the height of the GFC, the number of firms decline, but remain high
compared to the pre-GFC period. Despite post-GFC outcry from industry groups
and regulatory bodies, we find that CDS trading actually becomes more informative
during the GFC. Further analysis against an array of credit condition variables
reveals that CDS trading has the largest conditional price impact on firms that have
been recently downgraded, regardless of their ratings level. Interestingly, this result
holds for estimation periods that correspond to during and after the GFC, but not
before. While we also document a similar finding for firms that have been recently
upgraded, the magnitude of the conditional price impact is smaller relative to
downgrades.
Our findings show that, regardless of whether CDS trading cause the GFC, its
price discovery function as a derivative market was not impaired during the credit
crisis. On the contrary, CDS trading becomes more informative for an increasing
number of firms during the height of the GFC. Without CDS trading to process
credit-related information during the credit-crunch, we postulate that stock returns
may have been more volatile. Our results support criticisms that, prior to the GFC,
rating agencies are indeed slow in downgrading firms. Information flow from the
CDS to stock market is unaffected by rating changes. However, if downgrade
announcements made during and after the GFC generate large and statistically
significant conditional price impact on stock returns, this necessarily implies that,
during the midst of the GFC, rating agencies have gotten their act together.
Our paper proceeds as follows. We discuss institutional details and sampling in
Section I. The empirical methodology and results are discussed in Section II. Section
III concludes.
I. BACKGROUND AND SAMPLING
During the past decade, we have witnessed a remarkable growth in the global
CDS market. According to the International Swaps and Derivatives Association
(ISDA), the total outstanding notional amount of CDS contracts has increased 68
times from USD 0.92 trillion in 2001 to USD 62.17 trillion in 2007. While the market
size has reduced to USD 54.6 trillion by June 2008, it remains larger than the USD
Review of Futures Markets286
Figure 1. Time-Series Plots of the Cross-Sectional Average CDS Trading Variables.
We provide the time-series plots of the cross-sectional average CDS trading variables: CDS
spreads (bps) in Panel A; CDS returns in Panel B; absolute bid-ask spread (bps) in Panel C;
relative bid-ask spread in Panel D. The cross-sectional values are based on simple averaging
of firm level observations within the relevant credit category.
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48.36 trillion global bond market during the same period.3 Most of that remarkable
growth is driven by the US CDS market. Over the years, CDS spreads are
increasingly being regarded by the financial community as a benchmark indicator
of the underlying reference entity's credit risk.4 Hull et al. (2004) discuss the
advantages of CDS spreads over bond yield spreads as a measure of credit risk.
A. Review of Prior Studies
Although it was conceived in the early 1990s, the CDS market did not start to
gain prominence until 2002. For that reason, academic research on the CDS market
is still in its early stages. Ericsson et al. (2009) and Greatrex (2009) investigate the
determinants of CDS spreads. Blanco et al. (2005) examine credit risk dynamics
between the CDS and bond markets for 16 US investment-grade firms over 18
months. They document an evident cross-market credit risk pricing relation, which
confirms the theoretical relation derived by Duffie (1999). Specifically, Blanco et
al. (2005) find that the CDS market is more efficient than the bond market in
reflecting credit risk information.
Fewer studies have examined trading interactions between CDS and equity
markets in the context of credit ratings. An economic link exists between the two
markets since equity holders own residual claims on a firm upon default. Hence,
credit risk matters to equity holders as well, and stock returns should reflect credit-
related information relevant to the firm. Theoretically, the seminal work of Merton
(1974) establishes a link between equity value and credit risk under structural credit
risk pricing.5 Investment banks and hedge funds already have in place trading
strategies to take advantage of lead-lag return dynamics between the CDS and
equity markets. Yu (2006) finds that at a portfolio-level capital structure arbitrage
yields Sharpe ratios that are comparable to other hedge fund strategies.6
Longstaff et al. (2003) examine weekly lead-lag effects amongst the CDS,
bond and stock markets. They find evidence of information flow from both CDS
and stock markets onto the bond market. However, there is no clear evidence on
whether the CDS market is leading the stock market, or vice versa. Hull et al.
3. Source: BIS Quarterly Review, Dec. 2008.
4.  See Longstaff et al. (2005), Blanco et al. (2005), Yu (2006), and Acharya and Johnson (2007) for
a discussion on CDS spreads as a measure of credit risk.
5. Equity-holders are able to retire debt at maturity and claim firm ownership. This is akin to holding
a call option against debt-holders on firm assets, with the face-value of debt as the strike price.
Accordingly, the probability of non-exercise is analogous to the probability of default. Any information
that affects a firm’s credit worthiness will affect the value of equity-holders’ embedded call options,
hence its stock price.
6.  Capital structure arbitrage (CSA) is a convergence strategy that captures mispricing (divergence)
between the market-observed CDS spread and model-implied CDS spread extracted from stock
prices using, for example, RiskMetrics CreditGrades model. While the CDS position can be quite
large, CSA does not normally evoke frequent trading. For example, Yu (2006) reports convergence
rates of less than 5% for a 180-days maximum holding period. In other words, more than 95% of
CDS positions in the CSA strategies considered in Yu (2006) are held for 180 days. In a current CSA
project that we are working on, we can report that the average CDS holding period across an array of
CSA strategies range between 35 to 43 days.
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(2004) find that the CDS market anticipates rating downgrade, and to a certain
extent, review for downgrade as well. However, they did not examine the equity
market. Norden and Weber (2004) find that CDS and equity markets both anticipate
rating downgrades, but they did not formally analyze information flow between the
two markets in the context of rating changes.
Fung et al. (2008) examine information transmission between stock market
and CDS market indices between 2001 and 2007. For the speculative-grade CDS
index, they find two-way lead-lag relations. But for the investment-grade CDS
index, they find that the stock index leads the CDS index. This suggests that the
information transmission mechanism between the two markets is conditional on the
credit quality of the firm. Using implied CDS extracted from structured credit risk
model, Forte and Pena (2009) also find that the stock market leads the CDS market
for the majority of their sample of 17 non-financial firms. In stark contrast, Acharya
and Johnson (2007) find that negative private information is first revealed in the
CDS market through insider trading before it is transmitted over to the stock market.
Their study is based on 79 U.S. firms between January 2001 and October 2004.
However, Acharya and Johnson (2007) analyze rating level rather than rating changes.
Norden and Weber (2009) find that stock return rit exerts a heavier influence
on changes in CDS spread  ∆CDSit for firms with lower credit ratings. Hilscher et
al. (2012) also document limited information content in CDS trading to affect
subsequent stock return. However, neither study necessarily contradicts our main
finding. First, the tri-variate VAR estimation in Norden and Weber (2009), and the
regression in Hilscher et al. (2012) both impose a linear specification between rit
and ∆CDSit. Acharya and Johnson (2007) and Chng et al. (2013) both document an
evident nonlinear relation between rit and ∆CDSit, in accordance with the structural
credit risk pricing framework of Merton (1974). Second, Norden and Weber (2009)
examine mainly European firms, but our paper is on US firms. Institutional differences
between the US and European CDS and stock markets7 are likely to drive the
dissimilar results. Moreover, the sample period is from 2000 to 2002. It is not surprising
that CDS trading was uninformative in its earlier years. Third, although the Hilscher
et al. (2012) firm sample is more comparable, the sample period is from 2001 to
2007. Hence our finding of increasing informativeness in CDS trading as the
estimation window approaches the GFC in September 2008 does not necessarily
contradict the Hilscher et al. (2012) finding.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature with a comprehensive analysis
that covers about 300 US firms over an extended sample period that covers the
GFC. We apply the Acharya and Johnson (2007) methodology to examine how
CDS return innovations affect stock returns conditional on rating changes. Lastly,
our moving-window estimation allows us to track the time-varying information flow
from the CDS to stock market for a large firm sample as we progress toward and
away from the height of the GFC.
7. For example, liquidity, contract clauses, trading regulations, and others.
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B. Testable Propositions
We discuss the development of two testable propositions to address the research
questions that we pose in this paper.
Proposition 1A: The informativeness of CDS trading on stock returns
is time-varying. The credit-crunch induced GFC is likely to impose a
severe structural break on the data. Hence the price impact of CDS
trading on stock returns is likely to be time-varying, especially when the
estimation window moves across the GFC.
Proposition 1B: The informativeness of CDS trading on stock returns
is stronger (weaker) as we move toward (away from) the height of
the GFC. CDS spreads are higher and more volatile surrounding the
height of the GFC. This has a two-fold effect in terms of enhancing the
degree of informed trading in the CDS market. First, uninformed investors
are likely to shun the market, especially given the bad publicity that the
CDS market has received during the crisis. Second, the substantially higher
and more volatile CDS spreads from mid-2008 onwards present informed
investors with trading opportunities that did not exist in the pre-GFC period.
Proposition 2A: The price impact of CDS trading on stock returns
conditional on rating changes is insignificant before the GFC, but
becomes significant during and after the GFC. We expect the price
impact of CDS trading on stock returns to be unaffected by rating change
announcements in the lead-up to the GFC, consistent with prior studies
and criticisms made of rating agencies. But given the post-GFC public
outcry against rating agencies for not doing their job, it is possible that
rating agencies will get their act together and provide more timely and
informed ratings.
Proposition 2B: The conditional price impact of CDS trading on stock
returns is likely to be stronger for downgrades compared to upgrades.
Prior studies have found that the CDS market is efficient at processing
negative information. Accordingly, the magnitude of the conditional price
impact is likely to be stronger for downgrades compared to upgrades.
C. Samples and Variables
We define the CDS closing price CDSit as the daily mid-quotes of CDS
contracts from July 1, 2004, to August 31, 2010. Following prior studies, we focus
on five-year CDS contracts with USD 10 million notional amount written on senior
unsecured debt issued by US firms. Compared to other economies, the US CDS
market is clearly a larger, mature and more liquid market. CDS bid and ask quotes
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are obtained from DataStream. The final sample includes 302 U.S. firms8 for which
data is available for both CDS and equity markets over the entire sample period.
Firm i  daily stock returns rit for at time t and matching balance sheet data are
taken from CRSP and Compustat. Monthly S&P ratings on firms’ long-term debt
are also downloaded from Compustat.
We download Compustat monthly updated S&P credit ratings for each firm’s
long-term debt from June 2004 to August 2010. Table 1 shows the distribution of
firms across credit ratings, which we report in six-monthly intervals over the sample
period. Table 1 presents the average number of firms in each credit category. The
monthly number of firms in a given rating is averaged over the six-months horizon.9
Due to space constraint we report firm numbers for ratings that are bundled into
different credit categories.10
The majority of firms fall within AA+ and BB-, with a median rating of BBB.
The relevant columns also show that most of the shifts in ratings over time occur
among the three credit categories covering A+ to BB-. In the first sub-sample from
June 30, 2004, to December 31, 2004, there are 6.7 firms on average with a AAA
rating. Not surprisingly, that number dropped to 2.13 firms in the sub-sample ending
August 31, 2010. The next two credit categories also suffered a sharp decline. The
average number of AA+ to AA- (A+ to A-) firms fell from 16.67 to 12.33 (83 to
76.5) going from the second half of 2008 to the first half of 2009. In the BBB+ to
BBB- category, the average number of firms increased from 135.5 to 139.67. This
is not surprising given a substantial number of firms have been downgraded from
an A to a B rating. From BB+ downwards, there does not appear to be a substantial
shift by firms across rating categories over time.
In Figure 2, we plot the cross-sectional average of CDSit, ∆CDSit, ASit, RSit
for each credit category over the sample period. Table 1 shows that there are not
many firms rated as CCC+ and below. We observe, as expected, that the lower the
8. The overall firm sample covers 7 industry sectors. Consumer Non-cyclical, Consumer Cyclical
and Industrial contains 44, 35 and 33 firms, respectively. There are 27 Energy firms and 22 firms in
Basic Materials. Lastly, there are 7 firms in Technology and 6 firms in Communication.
9. For example, consider the 5 AAA-rated firms for the interval starting January 31, 2006. This can
be associated with having 4, 5 and 6 AAA-firms for 2 months each during that particular interval.
10. Prime is AAA; High Grade covers AA+, AA and AA-; Upper Medium Grade includes A+, A and
A-; BBB+, BBB and BBB- are in Lower Medium Grade; Non-Investment Grade Speculative includes
BB+, BB and BB-; Highly Speculative covers B+, B, and B-; Substantial Risk is CCC+; Extremely
Speculative is CCC. Lastly, the Junk category includes CCC- and below.
We analyze four CDS trading variables: CDS spread (CDSit ) which is the 
mid-point between the closing bid and ask quotes in basis points (bps), CDS 
return 
ΔCDS it  Ln
CDSit
CDSit−1

, absolute bid-ask spread ASit , and relative bid-ask 
spread 
RS it 
ASit
CDSit . In Figure 2, we plot the full-sample distribution for each of 
the four CDS variables. The distribution for CDSit is positively skewed with 80% 
of observations falling between 14.5bp and 200bp. About 90% of ∆CDSit falls 
between -6.78% to 7.19%. Both ASit and RSit are also positively skewed. 
Price Impact of CDS Spread 291
Figure 2. Full-Sample Distributions of CDS Spread, CDS Return, Absolute Bid-Ask
Spread and Relative Bid-Ask Spread.
Review of Futures Markets292
T
ab
le
 1
.  
Fi
rm
 D
ist
ri
bu
tio
ns
 a
cr
os
s S
&
P 
C
re
di
t C
at
eg
or
ie
s 
ov
er
 T
im
e.
 
Pr
im
e 
H
ig
h 
G
ra
de
 
U
pp
er
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
G
ra
de
 
Lo
w
er
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
G
ra
de
 
Sp
ec
ul
at
iv
e 
G
ra
de
 
H
ig
hl
y 
Sp
ec
ul
at
iv
e 
Su
bs
ta
nt
ia
l 
ris
k 
Ex
tre
m
el
y 
Sp
ec
ul
at
iv
e 
Ju
nk
 
C
re
di
t 
ca
te
go
ry
: 
A
A
A
 
A
A
+ 
~A
A
- 
A
+~
A
- 
BB
B
+~
BB
B
- 
B
B+
~B
B
- 
B
+~
B-
 
C
CC
+ 
C
C
C 
C
C
-~
C
 
 
1 
2~
4 
5~
7 
8~
10
 
11
~1
3 
14
~1
6 
17
 
18
 
19
 
ab
ov
e 
Ju
l-D
ec
 2
00
4 
6.
71
 
17
.0
0 
95
.7
1 
12
8.
29
 
37
.2
9 
17
 
0 
0 
0 
Ja
n-
Ju
n 
20
05
 
5.
33
 
18
.5
0 
92
.3
3 
13
3.
50
 
34
.6
7 
17
.5
0 
0.
17
 
0 
0 
Ju
l-D
ec
 2
00
5 
5 
18
.5
0 
91
.1
7 
13
7.
00
 
32
.5
0 
17
.8
3 
0 
0 
0 
Ja
n-
Ju
n 
20
06
 
5 
18
.1
7 
89
.3
3 
14
0.
83
 
31
.5
0 
17
.1
7 
0 
0 
0 
Ju
l-D
ec
 2
00
6 
5 
19
.3
3 
86
 
13
9.
17
 
33
.5
0 
18
.6
7 
0 
0.
33
 
0 
Ja
n-
Ju
n 
20
07
 
5 
19
.8
3 
87
 
13
6.
67
 
34
.5
0 
19
 
0 
0 
0 
Ju
l-D
ec
 2
00
7 
5 
20
 
86
 
13
6.
33
 
35
.6
7 
19
 
0 
0 
0 
Ja
n-
Ju
n 
20
08
 
4 
20
.5
0 
82
.8
3 
13
7.
17
 
38
.8
3 
18
.6
7 
0 
0 
0 
Ju
l-D
ec
 2
00
8 
4 
16
.6
7 
83
 
13
5.
50
 
40
.8
3 
21
.5
0 
0.
5 
0 
0 
Ja
n-
Ju
n 
20
09
 
4 
12
.3
3 
76
.5
0 
13
9.
67
 
40
.8
3 
20
.8
3 
5.
17
 
1.
67
 
1 
Ju
l-D
ec
 2
00
9 
3.
5 
12
.5
0 
75
 
13
8.
17
 
40
 
23
.6
7 
4 
3 
2.
17
 
Ja
n-
A
ug
 2
01
0 
2.
13
 
13
.8
8 
75
.6
3 
13
8 
39
.8
8 
27
.1
3 
3 
1.
25
 
1.
13
 
Th
e 
ta
bl
e 
re
po
rts
 th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
nu
m
be
r o
f 
fir
m
s 
in
 e
ac
h 
cr
ed
it 
ca
te
go
ry
 fo
r a
 g
iv
en
 s
ix
-m
on
th
 in
te
rv
al
. E
ac
h 
cr
ed
it-
ra
tin
g 
is
 a
ss
ig
ne
d 
a 
ra
tin
g 
sc
or
e 
(A
A
A
=1
, A
A
+=
2,
…
,C
=2
0)
. B
as
ed
 o
n 
m
on
th
ly
 S
&
P 
ra
tin
gs
, w
e 
ca
n 
w
or
k 
ou
t t
he
 to
ta
l n
um
be
r o
f 
fir
m
s 
in
 a
 g
iv
en
 c
re
di
t c
at
eg
or
y 
fo
r 
ea
ch
 m
on
th
. T
he
n 
w
e 
co
m
pu
te
 th
e 
m
on
th
ly
 a
ve
ra
ge
 n
um
be
r o
f f
ir
m
s 
in
 a
 g
iv
en
 c
re
di
t c
at
eg
or
y 
fo
r e
ac
h 
six
-m
on
th
 in
te
rv
al
. 
 
Price Impact of CDS Spread 293
credit category, the higher the level of CDSit  and  ASit . Across all credit categories,
the level of CDSit and ASit both increase as we approach the GFC. Although there
is an overall decline post-GFC, the levels of CDSit and ASit for all credit categories
remain high compared to the pre-GFC period.
Our preliminary analysis reveals that the levels of ASit and  RSit across credit
categories are the opposite of each other. The B+ to B- categories possess the
highest ASit, but the AAA category has the highest RSit. The RSit measure
standardizes fluctuations in bid-ask spreads using prices, which facilitates
comparisons across assets. However, it is not a suitable measure if fluctuation in
RSit is dominated by price volatility in certain assets, but by ASit in other assets.
Since the CDSit of lower rated firms are substantially more volatile than those with
higher ratings, we focus on ASit in our analysis. Interestingly, ∆CDSit is more volatile
for AAA firms compared to B+, B and B- firms in the lead-up to the GFC, but they
become comparable post-GFC. This is a preliminary indication that fluctuations in
CDSit over time are not necessarily associated with the level of credit-rating.
Table 2 contains the descriptive statistics of key trading variables. It is worth
noting that CDS trading variables are generally larger compared to stocks. This is
because CDS prices (mid-quotes) CDSit are in basis points(bps).
11 Nonetheless,
the high and low values do appear to be quite extreme. For example, the median
CDSit is 62.61 bps, but it has a high of 29,299.21 bps for AMBAC Financial Group
on May 20, 2010. The median  ASit and RSit are 12.77 bps and 12.11%, respectively,
but they have maximum values of 4,217bps and 199.57%, respectively. In general,
a large gap between the median and its minimum and/or maximum values normally
indicates the presence of outliers. Further examination of the sample reveals that
these extreme values come from firms that are rated CCC+ and below, such as
AMBAC Financial Group. Furthermore, Table 1 also shows that these firms
constitute 5% or less of the firm sample. Accordingly, we drop these outlier firms
from our main analysis.
II. METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
A. Diagnostic Check and Preliminary Analysis
Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests confirm that pit and CDSit are I(1)
processes for every firm, such that rit and ∆CDSit are stationary over time. This
holds in both full- and sub-samples. In Figure 3a, we plot the stock return distribution
for the pooled firm sample. The graph suggests a leptokurtic distribution. Next, we
plot the time-series of the cross-sectional average return between AAA firms and
firms in the B+ to B- category in Figure 3b. The two plots show that B-rated firms
display more volatility clustering over time. This suggests that different estimation
procedures may be required when we analyze stock returns across different credit
11. For example, an increase in CDSit from 80bps to 90bps. The increase in only 10bps, but ∆CDSit
is 12.5%. For another example, consider a CDS contract that has a best bid and ask quote of 95bps
and 105bps, respectively. This translates to a relative bid-ask spread of 10/100, or 10%.
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categories. For example, we may need to specify a GARCH process when testing
the impact of CDS return on stock returns for firms with lower credit ratings.
Table 1 shows that more than 70% of our firm sample are rated as investment-
grade firms (BBB- and above). In general, these are good quality firms with
substantial analyst coverage. Following Acharya and Johnson (2007) and Fung et
al. (2008), we assume that rit incorporates publicly available information. Hence
any informed trading activity in the CDS market will deliver a significant price
impact on the rit of the underlying reference entity.
To gauge the inherent cross-market interactions between the stock and CDS
markets, we examine the cross-serial correlation structure between rit and ∆CDSit
in Figure 4. We plot the correlations between  ∆CDSit and  rit–k for k = –5, –4, ..., 0,
..., +5 for all firms and firms grouped by credit categories. We also plot correlation
structures for the entire sample period as well as sub-samples. The various
correlation structures we plot are consistent with those reported in Acharya and
Johnson (2007). There is a strong negative contemporaneous correlation between
∆CDSit and rit. This is expected since a firm that experiences credit deterioration
will exhibit both widening CDS spreads and negative stock returns.
Figures 4B and 4C show that correlation between the CDS and stock markets
Note: The left panel shows the stock return distribution for the pooled sample, while the
right panel shows the time-series of cross-sectional average stock return for credit
category AAA and B+~B-.
Figure 3.
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is evidently stronger in the second half sample period. Fung et al. (2008) also
document substantially stronger correlation from the later half of 2007 onwards.
For our overall sample, the maximum contemporaneous correlation is –0.452. The
mean and median correlation coefficients are –0.153 and –0.150, respectively. But
for the period  July 1, 2007, to August 31, 2010, the mean and median correlation
coefficients are –0.208 and –0.210, respectively.
More importantly, cross-serial correlations between ∆CDSit and future stock
returns has increased when we move from the pre-GFC to GFC sub-sample, and
this is observed across all rating categories. The preliminary evidence indicate that
fluctuations in CDS spreads have become informative during the course of the
GFC, regardless of the rating level.
B. Analyzing Credit Risk Information Flow
1. Measuring the Conditional Price Impact of CDS Trading
Acharya and Johnson (2007) utilize a two-stage least square approach to
analyze the informativeness of CDS trading on stock returns. From the first-stage
estimation in equation (1), we extract a time-series of CDS return innovation εit.
By regressing ∆CDSit against lagged CDS and stock returns, as well as the current
stock return  rit that reflects all publicly available information, we can regard εit as
a proxy for private information that is traded through the CDS market. Equation (1)
also includes a series of interacting variables between lagged stock returns and
current CDS spread level CDSit , which allows for the nonlinear impact of CDS
fluctuations on stock returns. We use the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) to
determine the optimal lag specification (S) on a firm-by-firm basis.
0 1
0
0 1 2 1 2
1
[ ( )]
[ ]
S
it s
it i is it s is it s is it
its
S
it i is it s is jt it s is it s is jt it s it
s
rCDS CDS r
CDS
r a a r a D r b b D
α α β γ ε
ε ε ω
−
− − −
=
− − − −
=
∆ = + ∆ + + +
= + + + + +
∑
∑
(1)
(2)
For the second-stage regression in equation (2), we regress rit against the 
sum of lagged CDS return innovations 1
S
s it-sε=∑ to ascertain if informed CDS 
trading has any influence on stock return. If  ∑s1S b1is  is jointly significant, this 
implies that ∑s1S it−s  imposes a significant unconditional permanent price 
impact on rit. Conversely, if ∑s1S b1is  is jointly insignificant, this implies that 
CDS trading innovations do not exert a persistent impact on stock returns. 
Equation (2) also includes the sum of lagged interacting variables ∑s1S Djtit−s  
to further test if the informativeness of CDS trading is affected by a firm’s credit 
condition, as indicated by the credit condition dummy Djt. If  ∑s1S b2is  is jointly 
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Figure 4A.
Note: We plot the average correlations between CDS return and   5 lead/lag stock returns
based on the full sample period. We present correlations based on the entire firm sample
as well as for individual credit categories.
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Figure 4B.
Note: We plot the average correlations between CDS return and   5 lead/lag stock returns
based on the first half sub-sample Jun 2004 to Jun 2007. We present correlations based on
the entire firm sample as well as for individual credit categories.
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Figure 4C.
Note: We plot the average correlations between CDS return and   5 lead/lag stock returns
based on the second half sub-sample Jul 2007 to Aug 2010. We present correlations based
on the entire firm sample as well as for individual credit categories.
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2. Construction of  Credit Condition Dummy Variables
significant, this implies that  ∑s1S Djtit−s   imposes a significant and permanent 
conditional price impact on rit. To ensure that any significant finding is not the 
result of unexplained stock return lag dynamics, equation (2) allows lagged stock 
returns to also impose both unconditional (∑s1S a1 is ) and conditional 
(∑ s1S a2is ) price impact on rit.  
We consider five credit condition dummy variables that are designed to 
indicate the deteriorating in a firm’s credit quality. Denote Djt = { CDSitD , 
CDSit
D∆ , BBBitD , downitD , which we sequentially substitute to estimate equation 
(2). CDSitD  , CDSitD∆  and BBBitD are similar to the credit condition dummies 
considered in Acharya and Johnson (2007). In equation (3), CDSitD  and CDSitD∆  
detect credit deterioration base on a firm’s CDS spread. CDSitD  indicates whether 
the price of default protection against Firm i exceeds 100bps of the insured debt. 
CDSitD∆  captures a one-day rise in  CDSit of more than 50bps. These are the 
same thresholds used by Acharya and Johnson (2007).  
The three credit-rating dummy variables are outlined in equation (4). DBBB it  
is set with BBB rating as the threshold because market participants generally 
consider a BBB S&P rating as the borderline between investment-grade and 
speculative-grade status. Ddown it  and Dup it  correspondingly indicate if a firm 
has recently experienced a downgrade and upgrade. The end-of-month credit 
rating of each firm allows us to infer if the firm has a rating change during the 
month. We set Ddown it  1 ( Dup it  1 ) every day for the coming month for a 
firm that receives a lower (higher) rating compared to the previous month. For 
example, consider Firm i that is rated A at the end of Month k – 1.  Assume it has 
been downgraded to B at the end of Month k.  For this firm, we set Dd own it  1 
for every day during Month k + 1. The construction of Dup it  is similarly 
described. 
(4)
1, ;
DBBBit 0,
if BBB or lower
otherwise.
=
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
1 Month k 1, if downgraded; 1 Month k , if upgraded;
0, otherwise 0, otherwisedownit
t  +  t  +1  
Dupit. .
D ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈=
⎧ ⎧⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪=⎨ ⎨⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎩
CDS CDS
1, if CDS bp; 1, if CDS bp;
0, otherwise 0, otherwise
it it
it it
 100  50
D D
. .∆
⎧ ⎧> ∆ >⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪= =⎨ ⎨⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎩
(3)
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In Table 3, we report the number of firms that have been detected by each of
the five dummy variables at least once over the sample period.12 We allocate firms
into various credit categories based on their time-series average credit-rating. For
that purpose, we assign numeric values to each of the 21 S&P ratings. AAA is
assigned 1, AA+ is assigned 2 and so forth. C, which is the lowest rating, is assigned
21.
All five dummy variables exhibit similar firm distributions across credit
categories. 288 out of 302 firms have CDSit exceeding 100bp at least once during
the sample period. This is expected since Figure 1 shows that CDS spreads soared
during the GFC. One hundred thirty four of these firms are in the BBB+ to BBB-
category. This is followed by the A+ to A- category with 76 firms and BB+ to BB-
with 49 firms. 190 out of 302 firms experience a single-day rise in CDS spread of
more than 50bp at least once during the sample period. The largest category is
BBB+ to BBB- with 89 firms, followed by the BB+ to BB- category with 47 firms,
and A+ to A- category with 34 firms. For the credit-rating dummies, interestingly,
the firm distributions for               and              are identical. Upon further examination
it turns out that each of the 244 firms has experienced at least a downgrade and an
upgrade during the sample period.
3. Full Sample Period Panel Estimation
We estimate equation (1) for each firm over the entire sample period to extract
εit. The cross-sectional mean and median R2 are 10.63% and 9.19%, respectively.
These values are higher than those reported by Acharya and Johnson (2007), which
is not surprising given we expect a higher degree of co-movement between  ∆CDSit
and  rit for a sample period that contains the GFC. The mean and volatility of εit are
also larger than those in prior studies. Again, this is expected, given that many firms
experience substantial credit deterioration, especially in the second half of the sample
period. The estimation of equation (2) allows us to formally test if the larger and more
volatile CDS return innovations translates into greater price impact on equity returns.
itdownD itupD
12. To note, the dummies are non-mutually exclusive; for example it is possible for a firm to be
assigned 1 for               ,                ,  and                .CDSD it CDSD it∆ DBBBit
Ideally, we would set downitD  and upitD  corresponding to actual rating 
change announcement dates, if we have the data. However, note that Ddo wn it  and 
Dup it  are only picking up rating changes with a delay during Month k + 1, rather 
than Month k. This would actually make any significant findings of conditional 
price impact associated with rating changes even stronger. As a robustness check, 
we also consider rating change dummy variables to indicate firms that have been 
downgraded (upgraded) in the past month, and has not been upgraded 
(downgraded) in the last three months. Since the main results are consistent with 
those using downitD  and upitD , we focus on reporting results based on downitD  
and Dup it . 
Review of Futures Markets302
T
ab
le
 3
. D
um
m
y 
V
ar
ia
bl
e 
F
ir
m
 D
ist
ri
bu
tio
ns
 a
cr
os
s C
re
di
t C
at
eg
or
ie
s. 
 
bp
D
it
CD
S
10
0
>
 
bp
D
it
CD
S
50
∆
>
 
it
BB
B
D
 
it
do
wn
D
 
it
upD
 
To
ta
l 
28
8 
19
0 
19
6 
24
4 
24
4 
A
A
+~
A
A
- 
12
 
4 
0 
9 
9 
A
+~
A
- 
76
 
34
 
10
 
63
 
63
 
B
B
B+
~B
B
B-
 
13
4 
89
 
12
1 
11
0 
11
0 
B
B
+~
BB
- 
49
 
47
 
49
 
47
 
47
 
B
+~
B
- 
16
 
16
 
16
 
15
 
15
 
Th
e 
ta
bl
e 
pr
ov
id
es
 th
e n
um
be
r o
f f
irm
s,
 w
ith
in
 e
ac
h 
cr
ed
it 
ca
te
go
ri
es
,t
ha
t h
av
e
be
en
 in
di
ca
te
d 
by
 a
 g
iv
en
 d
um
m
y 
va
ri
ab
le
 a
t l
ea
st
 o
nc
e.
 
Price Impact of CDS Spread 303
We conduct a series of panel estimation of equation (2) by alternating among
each of the five credit condition variables Djt . Full sample period results are reported
in Table 4 (panel B), while rolling-window estimation results are presented in the
next section. For panel estimation, we need to be mindful of potential biases in the
standard errors that could lead to invalid test statistics. In general, biases in standard
errors are caused by either serial dependence in the residuals of a given firm, or
cross-sectional dependence in firms’ residuals at a given time. Pooled panel OLS
estimation is potentially exposed to both. For our panel estimation we address the
preceding concern by computing test statistics using the Petersen (2009, RFS Section
2.1) adjustment for cross-sectional dependence.14
There are two reasons why we focus on cross-sectional dependence. First,
our main analysis on conditional price impact is based on various indicative measures
of each firm’s credit condition. To the extent that change in credit condition is
systemic, especially during the GFC, this is likely to cause cross-sectional dependence
in the residuals across firms. As one of our main objectives is to investigate time-
varying patterns in the informativeness of CDS trading on stock returns as we
approach and depart from the height of the GFC, we need to ensure that any
significant findings are robust to adjustments for cross-serial dependence. Second,
we are less concerned with serial dependence. The panel regression applies to
equation (2). Each firm’s εit is extracted from time-series regression of (1), which
contains lags of both stock and CDS returns. In addition, lags of stock returns and
CDS return innovations are also included in the estimation of equation (2).
13. For example, if the firm proportions for the three sets of coefficients are all close to zero, this
raises serious questions about the validity of equation (1), and of the CDS trading innovations that
we extract.
14. We thank the  anonymous referee for reminding us about the issue of invalid test statistics and for
bringing to our attention the Petersen (2009) paper, which is a very good reference for papers that
utilize panel regressions.
In Panel B, the results show that ∑s1S b1 s  is jointly insignificant across all
Djt. However, the conditional price impact ∑ s1S b2 s  is jointly significant for all 
Djt. This confirms existing studies that informed trading in the CDS market 
In addition to the above summary statistics, we report in Table 4 (panel A) 
the proportion of firms for which each of the three sets of estimated coefficients 
∑ s0S  is , ∑s0S is  and ∑ s0S  is  are jointly significant in equation (1). Our 
main analysis is based on the estimation of equation (2), which utilizes the 
residuals extracted from equation (1). Hence it is important to gauge whether 
equation (1) provides a reasonable specification for our sample.13 Table 4 (panel 
A) confirms that equation (1) fits our sample reasonably well. Own-lag CDS 
returns (∑s0S  is ) are jointly significant in more than 50% of firms throughout 
the sample period. Current and lagged stock returns (∑s0S is ) are jointly 
significant for between 30% and 45% of firms. Lastly, non-linear effects between 
CDSit  and lagged stock returns (∑s0S is ) are also jointly significant for 
between 30% and 47% of firms. 
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Table 4 provides an overview of the conditional price impact of CDS return
innovations on stock returns. In the following two sections, we perform (i) rolling-
window and (ii) firm-level estimation to acquire better insights into the nature of
credit-risk information flow from the CDS market to the stock market during the
course of the GFC.
C. Rolling-Window Estimation
Acharya and Johnson (2007) find that the CDS market is more efficient than
the equity market at processing negative private information. It would be interesting
to see how the conditional price impact of lagged εit on  rit varies as the estimation
window moves towards and away from the height of the GFC. More importantly,
we need to validate if the price impact of εit and ratings downgrades both vary in
response to the GFC, rather than in association with each other.
We set the estimation window at 700 observations, which we forward shift in
steps of 100 observations. This translates into 9 rolling-windows {RW1,...,RW9}
revolves around negative firm information. The magnitude of the conditional 
price impacts are also comparatively larger than the corresponding ∑s1S b1s  for 
all Djt. Take CDSitD∆ , for example. Its 
S
s 1 2s| b=∑ = 1.54% while Ss 1 1s| b |=∑  = 
0.04%; for downitD , the conditional and unconditional price impacts are 2.24% 
and 0.19% respectively. The exception is upitD . Intuitively, there exists an 
inverse relation between lagged εit and rit. If CDS trading revolves around 
negative information, then CDS return innovations would have a curtailed impact 
on stock returns for firms that experience a recent upgrade. More importantly, 
although the magnitude of ∑ s1S b2s  for Dup it  is smaller than ∑s1S b1s , it is 
highly significant. On a related note, our sample contains 266 and 170 firm-
month downgrades and upgrades respectively. Although there are more 
downgrades than upgrades, the numbers are comparable. 
For variables that are jointly significant, the sum of coefficients are 
negative, for example, for Ddown itt−s , Ss 1 2sb=∑ = –0.0224, while for 
CDS ( )t-sitD ε , Ss 1 2sb=∑  = –0.0173. This is consistent with expectation since a 
positive CDS innovation should impose a negative price impact on stocks. The 
magnitude of the price impact imposed by  it   ranges from 1.54% for CDSitD  to 
2.24% for Ddownit . Panel B contains a column of results for an alternative 
downgrade measure. Denote downitD
∗ = 1 when Firm i  is downgraded in the past 
month, and it has not been upgraded in the last three months. Table 4 shows that 
the magnitude of ∑s1S b2 s  increases from 2.24% to 6.29%. However, it is not 
statistically significant. We apply a similar measure for upgrades, but there is no 
substantial difference from the results based on Dup it . 
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over the entire sample period. RW4 and RW5 correspond to the onset of the GFC.
We vary the estimation window (between 500 and 700 observations) as well as the
rolling-step (between 50 and 150 observations). The main results are robust to
different configurations.15
15. Due to space constraint, we present results for the 700-window and 100-step configurations,
which are representative of results based on other configurations. The latter results are available
upon request.
16. The results are readily available upon request.
Table 5 reports the number of firms that has been indicated by a given 
dummy variable at least once during each RW. For CDSitD , the number of firms 
increase by 49 going from RW4 to RW5. There is a further increase of 28 firms 
to 182 from RW5 to RW6. A similar trend is observed for CDSitD∆ , where the 
number of firms increase from 105 in RW4 to 154 in RW5, and then to 182 firms 
in RW6. In contrast, the number of firms indicated by DBBB it  is quite stable 
across RWs. Table 1 suggests there is evident firm movements both in and out of 
the BBB+ to BBB- credit category over the sample period, which could explain 
the stability in firm numbers indicated by DBBB it . Dup it  and Ddo wn it  display 
contrasting time-trends, with Ddown it  gradually increasing until RW5. Then the 
number of firms jump from 127 to 165 in RW6, and declined slightly to 148 
firms in RW9. The number of firms indicated by Dup it  between RW1 and RW5 
is quite stable at around 90 firms. Dup it  then lost 21 firms in RW6, and a further 
12 firms in RW8. From November 10, 2008, to April 6, 2009, 38 (21) firms have 
been downgraded (upgraded). 
In Table 6, we present coefficient estimates and test statistics for ∑ s1S b1s  
and ∑ s1S b2s   across five panels corresponding to  Djt. Similar to Table 4, these 
results are generated from panel estimation of equation (2) across 
{RW1,...,RW9}, using the Petersen (2009) adjusted standard errors to compute 
test statistics. The results for ∑ s1S a 1s  and ∑s1S a2s  are generally consistent 
across the five panels. Hence we exclude them from Table 6, due to space 
constraint. Furthermore, they are not the coefficients of interest that relate to 
CDS trading informativeness.16 
For unconditional price impact, the majority of ∑s1S b1s  are jointly 
insignificant. This is consistent with Acharya and Johnson (2007). For the three 
rating dummies, ∑ s1S b1s   is jointly insignificant across all rolling windows, 
except Panel C RW1. But interestingly, Panels A and B reveal that ∑ s1S b1s  
becomes jointly significant correspondingly from RW4 and RW5 onward, which 
correspond to the onset and height of the GFC. However, the magnitude of 
unconditional price impacts are small compared to conditional price impacts, and 
this result is very consistent throughout Table 6. 
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For conditional price impact, panel A shows a similar time-variation in the 
joint significance of ∑s1S b2s  over rolling windows as compared to ∑s1S b1s . 
It becomes jointly significant from RW5 onwards, corresponding to the height of 
the GFC. The magnitude of ∑ s1S b 2s  jumps from 0.62% in RW4 to 5.92% in 
RW5. It declines to 2.33% in RW6, and stabilizes at slightly above 3% for the 
rest of the sample period, but these values remain larger compared to the pre-
GFC period. In both panels B and C, ∑s1S b2s  is jointly significant for the 
majority of rolling windows. However, there is a substantial increase in 
|∑ s1S b2s|   from RW5 onwards. For example, in panel B, |∑s1S b2s|  increases 
from 0.06% in RW4 to 0.47% in RW5. In panel C, |∑s1S b2s|  jumps from 0.1% 
in RW4 to 1.89% in RW5. Similar to panel A, |∑ s1S b2s|  for both panels B and 
C decline after RW5, only to stabilize for the rest of the sample period, but at a 
larger magnitude compared to the pre-GFC period. 
For downitD  in panel D, ∑ s1
S b 2s  becomes jointly significant from RW5 
onwards. Furthermore, instead of stabilizing as in panels A, B and C, |∑ s1S b2s|  
continues to increase in subsequent rolling windows. It jumps from 2.94% in 
RW5 to 7.51% in RW6, and gradually increases towards 12.35% in RW9. Panel 
D provides strong evidence to suggest that informed CDS trading imposes a 
significant and increasingly substantial price impact on the stock returns of firms 
that have been recently downgraded. However, this applies during and after the 
height of the GFC, but not before. From RW5 onwards, the magnitude of price 
impact conditional on Ddown it  is larger than other credit condition dummies. For 
CDSitD ,  |∑ s1
S b2s|   range from 0.62% to 5.92%. For CDSitD∆  , |∑ s1
S b2s|  
range from 3.65% to 5.36%. For firms rated BBB and below, the conditional 
price impact range from 1.74% to 3.03%. In contrast, |∑s1S b2s|  for Ddown it  
range from 2.94% in RW5 to 12.35% in RW9. 
For Dupit  in panel E, |∑s1S b2s|  ranges from 0.25% to 0.48% between 
RW6 and RW9, for which it is jointly significant. When discussing Table 4, we 
explain that if CDS trading revolves mainly around negative information, the 
magnitude of price impact conditional on a recent upgrade would be smaller. 
More importantly, consistent with panel D, the conditional price impact of 
upgrades is also jointly significant after the height of the GFC. 
In sum, Table 6 reveals some interesting insight into the time-varying 
informativeness of CDS trading on stock returns. We find that informed trading 
from the CDS market does revolve around negative news. In panels C, D and E, 
∑ s1S b1s  is jointly insignificant across rolling windows. In panels A and B, 
while ∑ s1S b 1s  becomes jointly significant from the onset of the GFC, their 
magnitudes are small compared to the corresponding ∑ s1S b 2s . In panels A, B 
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whether a firm has been downgraded the previous month. Panel D results imply
that, during and after the GFC, there is heightened informed CDS trading in the
relevant firms that have been recently downgraded by S&P. At the very least, this
suggests that rating downgrades have become more timely in the aftermath of the
GFC. To a certain extent, Panel E results also suggest that rating upgrades have
become more timely during the later half of the sample period, after the GFC.
D. Firm-level Estimation
The preceding results are based on the pooled panel regression of (2). In this
section we perfrom firm-level time series estimation of equation (2) to track the
number and proportion of firms for which           is jointly significant across
{RW1,..., RW9}. In addition to serving as a robustness check, the firm-level
regressions are designed to provide complementary insights into the time-varying
nature of CDS trading informativeness as we move towards and away from the
height of the GFC in RW5.
In Table 7 we report the mean, minimum, and maximum values for                    over
four panels corresponding to Djt =                                                We report both
the number and percentage of firms with a significant               . The percentages
are based on the total number of firms indicated by each Djt in a given RW.
1 2
S
s sb=∑
1 2
S
s sb=∑
1 2
S
s sb=∑
CDS CDSi i
{ , , , }.BBB downt t it itD D D D∆
and C, ∑s1S b 2s  is jointly significant for the majority of rolling windows. 
However, the magnitude of price impact substantially increases during the height 
of the GFC, and remains larger (relative to pre-GFC period) until the end of the 
sample period. 
More importantly, our results on Ddown it  suggest that information flow from 
the CDS market is prevalent in firms that were downgraded in the past month, 
regardless of their level of rating. Furthermore, the price impact of informed CDS 
trading conditional on downitD  is larger than those exhibited by CDSitD , CDSitD∆  
and DBBB it . However, this finding applies during and after the GFC, but not 
before. To reiterate, downitD  is an ex-post measure that is defined based on 
In panel A, the number of firms for which ∑s1S b2s  is jointly significant 
shows an evident reverse V-shape pattern over time. The number of firms 
gradually increases from 11 in RW1 to 49 in RW4, only to jump to 91 firms in 
RW5. Then, the number dropped sharply from 79 in RW6 to 52 firms in RW7, 
and stabilizes at around 48 firms for the rest of the sample period. CDSitD∆  in 
panel B reveals a similar time trend, with ∑ s1S b2s  jointly significant for around 
16 firms between RW1 and RW4. In RW5, there is a sharp increase to 62 firms, 
after which there is a gradual decline to 53 firms in RW6, 40 firms in RW7, and 
the number stabilizes at 28 and 27 firms in RW8 and RW9, respectively. Both 
CDSitD  and CDSitD∆  also show that the proportion of firms for which ∑ s1
S b2s  
is jointly significant is highest in RW5 and RW6, which correspond to the height 
of the GFC. 
Price Impact of CDS Spread 313
In Table 8, we estimate the unconditional price impact of εit on rit without
credit condition dummies. The reason is to check if the key findings prevail at the
firm-level without relying on any Djt. Table 8 shows that the number of significant
firms has a less evident time trend compared to Table 7. The largest price impact
occurs in RW5 and RW6, consistent with Tables 6 and 7. Hence the overall findings
in Table 8 support our discussions based on conditional price impact. However, we
achieve clearer variations over time and better insights by examining price impact
based on credit-condition dummy variables.
Our main result lends some support in defense of credit rating agencies. In the
aftermath of the GFC, credit rating agencies were heavily criticized for being slow
For DBBBit  in panel C, the number of significant firms more than doubled 
from 9 in RW4 to 22 in RW5 and RW6. This is followed by a gradual decline. In 
panel D, downitD  shows a similar trend in the number of significant firms. There 
is a jump from 22 to 39 firms going from RW4 to RW5, but a decline gradually 
to around 20 firms in RW9. While the time trend in firm numbers is similar 
between panels C and D, notice that |∑s1S b2s|  conditional on DBBB it  is on 
average higher than Ddo wn it  from RW2 to RW4. But from RW5 onwards, 
Ddown it  imposes a substantially larger conditional price impact than DBBB it . For 
example, in RW5, |∑ s1S b 2s|  is 2.96% for DBBBit  compared to 9.8% for 
Ddown it . This is similarly described for RW6 to RW8, although they become 
comparable in RW9. 
The overall results in Table 7 support our main findings in Table 6 to 
suggest that CDS innovations are most informative around the middle of the 
sample period, which corresponds to the height of the GFC. The proportion of 
significant firms is the highest in RW5 and RW6 across all four panels. 
Furthermore, the conditional price impact of εit is most substantive in firms that 
have been downgraded in the past month rather than current low-rated firms. The 
price impact conditional on downgrade is surprisingly larger than those based on 
CDSitD and CDSitD∆ . For example, in RW5, 1 2
S
s sb=∑  = –9.8% in panel D, 
compared to –7.85% and –7.08% in panels A and B, respectively. In RW6 
(RW7), 1 2
S
s sb=∑  = –6.3%(–5%) in Panel D, compared to –5.3% (–0.65%) and  
–3.7% (–2.77%) in panels A and B, respectively. 
Table 7 reiterates the interesting implication that rating downgrades affect 
the informativeness of CDS innovations on stock returns. In terms of the number 
of significant firms, rating downgrade is not as relevant as CDSitD  or CDSitD∆  in 
explaining credit risk information flow from the CDs to stock market. However, 
for those firms that are significant conditional on Ddown it , the magnitude of the 
conditional price impact is larger that credit-condition dummy variables based on 
the CDS market. Furthermore, the finding holds for downgrades, but not 
upgrades. This is despite that our overall sample contains a comparable number 
of downgrades and upgrades. 
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at downgrading firms. Our analysis shows that, at least during and post-GFC,
downgrades by S&P trigger information-based trading in the CDS market, which is
manifested in a significant conditional price impact of                    on stock returns.
E. Robustness Check for Informed Trading Activity
Microstructure theory predicts that bid-ask spreads will widen to reflect the
heightened risk of trading against informed investors. Our main analysis indicates
the presence of heightened informed trading activity through the CDS market
conditional on a firm’s recent credit deterioration. In this section, we perform a
robustness check by examining how absolute (ASit) and relative RSit bid-ask spreads
fluctuate over time. We associate heightened informed CDS trading with wider
bid-ask spreads. We find generally similar patterns between ASit and RSit.
Furthermore, since ASit fluctuates with the level of CDS spread, they may not be
as reflective of informed trading activity as compared to RSit. Hence we focus our
discussion on relative bid-ask spreads.17
We use firm-level estimation results in Table 7 to sort firms into two groups. In
the CDS (Equity) Group are firms for which CDS trading imposes a (in)significant
price impact on stock returns, conditional on a recent credit deterioration. Within
each group, we separately compute the daily cross-sectional average relative bid-
ask spread          for each credit category in each rolling window. This procedure is
carried out from RW1 to RW9, which allows us to compare the magnitude of
between the two firm groups over time. Our main results suggest heightened
informed trading in the CDS market in the second half of the sample period, in
particular RW5 to RW7. Hence we expect the        of the CDS Group to gradually
become larger than the Equity Group as we move from RW1 to RW7, followed by
a gradual decline.
In Table 9 we report the time proportion of each RW for which the         of the
CDS Group is larger than the Equity Group. The four panels correspond to price
impact results conditional on each of the four credit deterioration dummies            ,
     ,           , and             . Our earlier analysis indicates heightened informed
CDS trading from RW4 and RW5, with a slight decline to follow from RW7 onwards.
Hence we expect the time proportion results to display an N-shape pattern across
rolling windows. To aid the discussion, we plot the Table 9 results in Figure 5.
Out of the five rating categories, AA+ to AA- is the only category where there
is no evident time-trend in the time proportions across the four panels. This is not
surprising given that CDS informed trading is less likely to occur in firms with high
credit quality. But for the other rating categories, there are some evident results
that support out main findings. In panel A, the three middle-band rating categories
all display an upward time-trend towards RW7, with the A+ to A- and BB+ to BB-
categories showing a gradual decline after RW7. In panel B, an upward time-trend
is observed for the BBB+ to BBB- and BB+ to BB- categories, while an N-shape
pattern is observed for the A+ to A- category. Panels C and D display the strongest
down it-sit
D ε
RSt
RSt
17. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out to us.
CDSit
D
RSt
RSt
it
D CDS∆ itBBBD itdownD
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Figure 5.
Note: We plot the time proportion of each rolling-window for which the cross-sectional 
average relative bid-ask spread tRS for the CDS Group is larger than the Equity Group. 
The firm groupings are based on Table 7 results on whether the CDS innovations provide 
a jointly significant conditional price impact on stock returns. We plot four separate 
graphs base on each of the four indicative measures of credit deterioration.  
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evidence of N-shape patterns in the time proportions across various rating categories.
Indeed, Figure 5D, which is based on rating downgrades, shows that the majority of
rating categories display an evident N-shape pattern in the time-proportions over
time. This is consistent with Table 7, which shows that the informativeness of CDS
trading is strongest conditional on recent downgrades.
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS
One would instinctively expect the price discovery mechanism of any credit-
related market to cease functioning properly during a systemic credit-crunch,
including, and especially, the US CDS market. In this paper, we find that credit risk
information flow from the CDS market to the stock market did not weaken during
the course of the GFC. In fact, CDS trading is most informative during the height of
the GFC. Our significant findings are conditional on recent credit deteriorations, as
with Acharya and Johnson (2007). However, we find that CDS innovations
conditional on recent downgrades impose a larger price impact compared to other
credit condition dummy variables, including those used in Acharya and Johnson
(2007). We do not find significant price impact conditional on upgrades. This is
consistent with the literature’s finding that the informational efficiency of the CDS
market is skewed towards negative news.
Our paper offers an interesting finding that informed trading in the CDS market
is associated less with currently low-rated firms, and more with firms that have
been downgraded in the past month. This necessarily implies that downgrade
decisions by S&P, in particular those decisions made during and post-GFC, have
induced CDS traders to further examine those downgraded companies, trade their
private information through the CDS market, which subsequently flow onto the
stock market. Put differently, S&P downgrade decisions provide incremental
information to the CDS market about shifts in the credit quality of recently
downgraded firms.
Indeed, criticism of rating agencies displaying strong inertia in downgrading
firms is justified. Our analysis shows that CDS innovations do not display significant
price impact conditional on recent downgrades in the lead-up to the GFC. However,
our paper also lays support in defense of rating agencies in the aftermath of the
GFC, since their downgrade decisions have provided incremental information for
CDS traders to have a closer look at the recently downgraded firms. Indeed, at
least the rating agency S&P seems to have gotten its act together in the aftermath
of the GFC.
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